Stable Outcomes in Modified Fractional Hedonic Games

Thursday, February 28, 2019

2.30 p.m.

ISI seminar room 1st floor

Dr. Yllka Velaj - CWI Amsterdam


Teamwork, clustering and coalition formations have been important and widely investigated issues in computer science research. In fact, in many economic, social and political situations, individuals carry out activities in groups rather than by themselves. In these scenarios, it is of crucial importance to consider the satisfaction of the members of the groups. Motivated by these appications, we investigate Hedonic Games where self-organized coalitions are created as a result of the strategic interactions of independent agents.
For each couple of agents (i,j), weight wi,j reflects how much agents i and j benefit from belonging to the same coalition.
We are interested in the scenario in which agents, individually or jointly, choose to form a new coalition or to join an existing one, until a stable outcome is reached. To this aim, we consider common stability notions, leading to strong Nash stable outcomes, Nash stable outcomes or core stable outcomes: we study their existence, complexity and performance.