e t

structural properties of the graph and interesting classes of hedonic games. To this respect, consider bipartite graphs: they naturally induce a hedonic game modeling a basic economic scenario in which each agent can be considered as a buyer or a seller; this scenario, referred to in [2,15,16]

Table 2

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Nash

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Table 3 Main results presented in the paper

Strong Nash

Core

Fig. 2 Possible coalitions with three nodes

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Fig. 3 The graph G used in Theorem



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Fig. 9 The graph *G* used in Theorem

Finally, if $C = \{\{1, 2, 3\}\}, C = \{1, 2\}$ is a weakly blocking coalition. In fact, moving from their coalition in C to coalition